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Everyday choice options have advantages (positive values) and disadvantages (negative values) that need to be integrated into an overall
subjective value. For decades, economic models have assumed that when a person evaluates a choice option, different values contribute
independently to the overall subjective value of the option. However, human choice behavior often violates this assumption, suggesting
interactions between values. To investigate how qualitatively different advantages and disadvantages are integrated into an overall
subjective value, wemeasured the brain activity of human subjects using fMRI while they were accepting or rejecting choice options that
were combinations ofmonetary reward andphysical pain.We compareddifferent subjective valuemodels onbehavioral andneural data.
These models all made similar predictions of choice behavior, suggesting that behavioral data alone are not sufficient to uncover the
underlying integration mechanism. Strikingly, a direct model comparison on brain data decisively demonstrated that interactive value
integration (where values interact and affect overall valuation) predicts neural activity in value-sensitive brain regions significantly
better than the independent mechanism. Furthermore, effective connectivity analyses revealed that value-dependent changes in valua-
tion are associated with modulations in subgenual anterior cingulate cortex–amygdala coupling. These results provide novel insights
into the neurobiological underpinnings of human decision making involving the integration of different values.
Introduction
In everyday life,we choosebetweenoptionswithmultiple attributes.
The attributes of an option (e.g., shoes) can be qualitatively different
(aesthetics andexpenses) andareassociatedwithpositiveornegative
values. For successful choice behavior, individuals need to integrate
the different values into an overall subjective value.
Behavioral economics has investigated value integrationmecha-
nisms topredict choicebehavior across adistributionofpositive and
negative values. Multiattribute utility theory suggests that the sub-
jective valueofmultiattributeoptions equals theattributes’weighted
sum (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Wallenius et al., 2008). Although
thesemodels can predict choice behavior well (Huber, 1974;Walle-
nius et al., 2008), they require that the preference order of one attri-
bute is independent of other attributes. However, human choice
often violates this (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976); for example, when
selectingadinnermenuwithcheese, redwinehasahighervalue than
white wine. But, with fish, white wine has a higher value. Here, an
independent model fails to predict choice, whereas an interactive
integration model would successfully predict choice by permitting
an extra term for the dependence of attributes.
How the neural systemsmediate the value integration is not well
understood. The subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC) has
beenshowntoencodebothpositiveandnegativevalues (Bloodetal.,
1999; Plassmann et al., 2010). Also, the amygdala represents values
independentofvalence (Breiter et al., 1996,2001;Becerraet al., 2001;
Gasic et al., 2009). Furthermore, these structures play a key role in
both affect (Phelps et al., 2004) and pain regulation (Bingel et al.,
2006; Wiech et al., 2008). Thus, the sgACC and the amygdala are
ideally suited to facilitate interactive value integration.
In this study, we investigated how the brain integrates values
across discrete stimuli into one subjective value to guide decision
making. We hypothesized that (1) different values affect each other
and (2) the sgACCandamygdala are critically involved.To test these
hypotheses, we measured brain activity using fMRI while subjects
accepted or rejected offers that were combinations of qualitatively
different values of different valence (pain and money). The combi-
nation of values included a parametric variation in their intensities.
A well established approach to investigate cognitive processes
underlying decision making is to compare cognitive models on
behavioral data (O’Doherty et al., 2007;Mazur and Biondi, 2009;
Talmi et al., 2009; Bhatt et al., 2010; Navalpakkam et al., 2010).
However, if competing models predict the same pattern of
choices, behavioral data are limited (Bruni and Sugden, 2007). In
these cases, forcing the models to predict neural activity can pro-
vide decisive evidence (Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004; Hampton
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et al., 2006, 2008; Sanfey et al., 2006; Kable
and Glimcher, 2007; Loewenstein et al.,
2008). We tested four different subjective
valuemodelswith either independent or in-
teractive value integrationmechanisms.We
applied these models directly on behavioral
andneural data, looking for decisive informa-
tion about the implemented mechanism in
the brain. Finally, we investigated how differ-
entbrain regions interactwhenoneattribute’s
value affects another valuationprocess.
Materials andMethods
Subjects
Twenty-four healthymale subjects (age: 26.79
0.66 years) were included in the study. Subjects
reported no psychiatric or neurological disorder.
Written informed consent was obtained from all
participants after the procedure had been fully
explained. The study was approved by the Eth-
ics Committee of the Charite´–Universita¨tsme-
dizin Berlin.
Task
Individual pain stimulus selection. Before the
scanning session, subjects received 30 mild
shocks of varying levels in randomized order
and gave ratings on a visual analog scale (VAS)
(Price et al., 1994; Brooks et al., 2010). The very
left extreme of the VAS was labeled as 0 (not
unpleasant at all); the very right extreme was
labeled as 100 (worst imaginable unpleasant-
ness) (Fig. 1A). For the tactile-stimulus appli-
cation, we used a DS5 (Digitimer) stimulator
controlled by a stimulation computer. A ring electrode was placed on the
back of the left hand between thumb and index finger. For each subject,
we fitted a power function to these ratings (Price et al., 1983) and defined
five different pain stimuli with equal intervals in subjectively perceived
unpleasantness (Fig. 1B). All visual and tactile stimuli as well as response
recordings were controlled using Cogent2000 and MATLAB.
Associating tactile stimuli with visual stimuli. The set of five different
pain stimuli obtained for each individual was then associated with five
visual cues via a classical conditioning procedure. In each trial, a visual
cue predicting a specific stimulus strength was presented for 1 s. After a
1 s delay, the corresponding tactile stimulus was applied to the subject in
paired trials (80%), and no stimulation occurred in unpaired trials
(20%). Each association was repeated 10 times (Fig. 1C).
fMRI decision-making task. fMRI acquisition consisted of four runs with
60 trials each. In each trial, subjects viewed one offer. The offer was a com-
bination of a monetary amount and a visual pain cue that was learned pre-
viously.After a variabledelay, subjects either acceptedor rejected theoffer by
a left- or right-hand button press (Fig. 1D). Subjects were told that after the
entire experiment, 15 trials of each run would be randomly selected and the
accepted offers would be delivered to the subject (both money and pain),
whereas the rejected offers would not. We had 12 monetary offers for each
subject ranging from 1 to 99 cents (€) (mean 38 cent 2 SEM). For each
subject, all combinations of money–pain cue pairs occurred equally often.
All pain levels were paired with the complete range of monetary amounts.
Before entering the scanner, subjects performedapractice versionof the task
from which the range of monetary offers was selected for each subject, en-
suring that a similar number of offers would be accepted as well as rejected.
Subjective value models and behavioral analysis
The subjective value models integrated pain and money either indepen-
dently or they additionally assumed an interaction between both attri-
butes. The interactive term can be thought of as modulating the slope of
the value of money as a function of pain. It quantifies by how much the
increase in money (i.e., 1 to 99 cents) paired with low pain differs from
the same monetary increase paired with high pain (Fig. 2A–D). Behav-
ioral studies have suggested nonlinear value functions that allow concav-
ity for positive values and convexity for negative values (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). For completeness, we modeled the value functions for
pain andmoney in both a linear and nonlinearmanner.We refer to these
models as (1) linear independent, (2) nonlinear independent, (3) linear
interactive, and (4) nonlinear interactive (Fig. 2A–D). Mathematically,
all models can be represented as a special case of the nonlinear interactive
model, which defines the subjective value of a choice option x by the






where SV is the subjective value, mx is the monetary amount, px is the
pain level, and the s represent the weights for money, pain, and the
interaction, from left to right. The shape of the value functions for pain
and money is modulated by an exponent  and thus allowed to deviate
from linearity ( 1) to be concave ( 1) or convex ( 1). In case
the weight mp for the interaction of pain and money is set to zero,
Equation 1 represents the two independent models (Fig. 2A,B), and in
case the exponent for the value functions is 1, Equation 1 represents the
two linear models (Fig. 2A,C). For all models, we assumed that the
probability of accepting an option is a monotonic function of the op-
tions’ subjective value, as defined by the soft-max choice rule:
paccept x 
1
1  e·SV x
,
where  is a sensitivity parameter defining the slope of the sigmoid
function, that is, the choices’ stochasticity (the percentage of accepted
offers plotted as a function of subjective value of the nonlinear indepen-
dent model for demonstration; Fig. 2F).
Individual model parameters were estimated using a leave-one-out
cross-validation procedure by minimizing the mean squared errors
(MSE: average squared difference between the model prediction and sub-
jects’ actual choice behavior). Data from three runs were used to fit the free
Figure1. Multiattribute decision-making task.A, Subjects rated tactile stimulations of different strengths on aVAS.B, To select
five pain stimuli for each individual, we estimated individual power functions using the subjective unpleasantness ratings. C, The
five selected pain stimuli were then associated with five different visual cues using a classical conditioning procedure. D, fMRI
experiment. In each trial, subjects saw an offer, which was a combination of a visual pain cue and an amount of money. After a
variabledelay, subjects either acceptedor rejected theoffer. Subjectswere told that15 trialswouldbe randomly selectedat theend
of the experiment and both money and pain would be given in case the selected trial was an accepted offer and that they would
receive nothing if it was a rejected offer. ISI, Interstimulus interval; ITI, intertrial interval.
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model parameters, and their prediction accuracy
was computed on the fourth independent test
run. This procedure was repeated four times,
each time using a different run as the indepen-
dent test dataset. The prediction accuracy of a
given model was defined as the average MSE in
predicting the independent test data across all
four cross-validation steps. This procedure al-
lowed us to compare the MSE of four models
against each other in predicting choice behavior,
independentof themodels’complexities(i.e.,num-
ber of free parameters) (Stone, 1974; Hampton et
al., 2008). MSE scores did not significantly deviate
fromanormaldistribution(Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test,allpvalues0.7).Wethuscomparedthemod-
els’ ability to predict choice behavior using a 2 2
ANOVA(integrationmechanism shapeof value
function).
fMRI acquisition and preprocessing
Functional imaging was conducted on a 3 tesla
Siemens Trio scanner with 12-channel head
coil. In each of the four runs, 465 T2*-weighted
gradient-echo EPIs containing 33 slices (3 mm
thick) separated by a gap of 0.75 mm were ac-
quired. Imaging parameters were as follows:
TR  2000 ms, TE  30 ms, flip angle  90°,
matrix size  64  64, and FOV  192 mm,
voxel size 3 3 3.75mm.
Functional data were analyzed using SPM5
(Wellcome Department of Imaging Neurosci-
ence). The first three volumes of each run were
Figure 2. Subjective values of the four models. The subjective values (SV) of the correspondingmodel as a function of money are plotted. Color of the data points indicates the level of pain (i.e.,
the darker the points, the higher the pain level).A, Linear independent;B, nonlinear independent; C, linear interactive;D, nonlinear interactive. In the interactivemodels (C,D), the subjective values
from different pain levels are not only shifted on the y-axis but also have different slopes, that is, the difference between high money versus lowmoney is modulated depending on the combined
pain level (data fromone subject for demonstration).E,MSEof the fourmodels inpredicting choicebehavior.Whenvalue functionsweremodeled in a linear fashion, the interactivemodels predicted
the choice behavior better compared with the independent models (t(23) 4.17, p 0.0001). However, when value functions were modeled nonlinearly, both integration mechanisms did not
differ substantially (t(23) 1.28, p 0.21). Note that the better predicting model has smaller MSE. Error bars indicate SEM. F, The probability to accept increases as a function of subjective value
(nonlinear interactive model). Error bars indicate SEM.
Figure 3. Predicted and actual percentage of accepted offers. The probability to accept plotted as a function of the subjective
values (SV) derived from the fourmodels. Blue lines indicate themodel predictions and red dots indicate the actual choice behavior
(percentages of accepted offers, binned in 10 categories). Data of a single subject are shown for illustration.A, Linear independent;
B, nonlinear independent; C, linear interactive; D, nonlinear interactive.
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discarded to allow for magnetic saturation ef-
fects. Images were slice time corrected, re-
aligned, spatially normalized to a standard T2*
template ofMNI, resampled to 3mm isotropic
voxels, and spatially smoothed using an 8 mm
FWHM Gaussian kernel. All included subjects
moved less than the size of a single voxel (3
mm; maximal between-scan movement in
mm,mean SEM, x 0.15 0.02; y 0.36
0.04; z 0.61 0.1; in radians, mean SEM,
pitch  0.0087  0.0025; roll  0.0031 
0.0004; yaw 0.0025 0.0003).
Model-based fMRI data analysis
To test the four models against each other at
the neural level, for each subject, we set up a
GLM with a parametric design (Bu¨chel et al.,
1998) for each subjective value model, result-
ing in four GLMs per subject. Each GLM had
three regressors of interest: (1) onset of the of-
fer, (2) the trial-wise subjective value of the of-
fer, and (3) response onset. The subjective
value regressor was created by parametrically
modulating the stimulus function of the offer
onset by the standardized (mean 0, SD 1)
trial-wise subjective values derived from the
four models. The regressors were convolved
with a canonical HRF and orthogonalized with respect to the offer onset.
All regressors were simultaneously regressed against the BOLD signal in
each voxel. The regressors for offer and response onset are identical in all
subjective value models; thus, the individual t maps of the subjective
value regressors are proportional to the amount of variance in the BOLD
response that is explained solely by each of the subjective valuemodels in
each voxel (i.e., effect size). The tmaps of all four models were taken to a
second-level random effect analysis.
First, to identify brain regions significantly correlating with the aver-
age of all four subjective value models, the four effect size images were
averaged and tested (p 0.001, uncorrected, k 10). Second, analogous
to the behavioral comparison, we set up a second-level random effect
analysis, using a 2  2 ANOVA. Because the aim of this study was to
identify which integrationmechanism is used by the brain, the important
comparison is the difference between interactive and independent mod-
els (and vice versa, collapsing across the value function shapes). The same
procedure was applied to compare nonlinear and linear subjective values
on the neural level. For this analysis, we applied a threshold of p 0.005,
k  5, uncorrected within the mask of the average map of subjective
values (p 0.05). After having identified the regions in which changes in
BOLD signal were significantly better predicted by the interactivemodels
compared with independent models, we extracted the effect sizes of this
region. We then performed post hoc t tests to investigate whether the
interactive models made better predictions also for both linear and non-
linear value functions separately.
Finally, to resolve the question that could not be answered with the
behavioral data, namely the superiority of the integration mechanism
within the nonlinear models, we compared the effect sizes of the nonlin-
ear interactive and the nonlinear independent models on a whole brain
level using voxelwise paired t tests (p 0.001, uncorrected).
Task-dependent changes in connectivity with the sgACC
We performed a whole-brain psychophysiological interaction (PPI)
analysis (Friston et al., 1997; Kahnt et al., 2009; Park et al., 2010) with the
sgACC as a seed region. After having shown that the sgACC is involved in
interactive value integration, we aimed to investigate how the interaction
between pain andmoney actually modulates the effective connectivity of
the sgACC with any other brain region. In contrast to the standard PPI
analysis with only one psychological factor, we set up a PPI using two
psychological factors (pain andmoney).We then searched for changes in
effective connectivity with the interaction of pain and money. We first
sorted all trials according to their pain andmoney levels into nine classes
(3 money [low, middle, and high] 3 pain [low (levels 1 and 2), middle
(level 3), and high (levels 4 and 5)]). We extracted the entire time series
from each subject in the cluster of the sgACC, in which activity showed
significantly higher correlation with subjective values of the interactive
models compared with that of the independent models (see Results,
Neural representation of different subjective values). We first created
regressors for each of the three pain levels. Within each of these three
regressors, we coded the three money levels; that is, six TRs following the
onset of highmoney trials were coded as 1, whereas six TRs following the
Figure 4. Brain regions encoding the subjective value of the four models. A, Linear independent; B, nonlinear independent; C,
linear interactive;D, nonlinear interactive. Slices represent coronal (left) and sagittal (right) views of structural brain images with
superimposed statistical maps.
Figure 5. sgACC is involved when value affects valuation. A, sgACC (0, 27,15) show-
ing significantly larger effect sizes for the subjective values (SV) of the interactive com-
pared with the independent models in a direct whole-brain model comparison. Slice
represents the sagittal view of structural brain image with superimposed statistical map.
B, This difference was also significant when testing the linear and nonlinear models
separately. Error bars indicate SEM.
Table 1. Average effects of subjective values (p< 0.001, k 10)
MNI
Region name BA x y z t value
L OFC 11 21 33 15 3.83
Medial OFC 32 0 39 3 3.69
L Central OFC 10 36 48 6 4.39
R dlPFC 8 42 30 51 4.09
L dlPFC 8 24 36 54 3.67
L Parietal cortex 7 24 63 54 3.67
R Parietal cortex 40 51 42 57 3.43
L Occipital lobe 18 12 96 6 7.70
R Occipital lobe 18 27 99 6 4.39
L Cerebellum 27 81 48 3.65
R Cerebellum 42 81 33 4.18
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onset of lowmoney trials were coded as1, and the middle money trials
were coded with zeros. The time window of six TRs was selected to
capture the entire hemodynamic response function (Kahnt et al., 2009;
Park et al., 2010). These regressors were then multiplied by the nor-
malized time series of sgACC. Thus, for each pain level, the resulting
regressor represents the interaction between sgACC activity and
money for one pain level. The middle regressors of pain and money
were included in the single-subject model, but were not used to com-
pute the group contrasts because of the smaller number of trials in
these classes. Importantly, the created PPI regressors were used as
covariates in a separate regression, which also included all the psy-
chological regressors [three onset regressors for three pain levels, each
regressor coding the onset of high money (as 	1), middle money (as
0), and low money (as 1), convolved with an HRF] and the physi-
ological regressor (the entire time series of sgACC). Because the seed
region is defined (the contrast interactive vs independent) in a similar
way as the psychological factor of the PPI regressors (interaction
between pain and money), the psychological, PPI, and physiological
regressors may be correlated. Note that this deviates from the stan-
dard PPI approach, in which the seed ROI definition is usually or-
thogonal to the psychological factor. However, because we entered all
regressors simultaneously into the model, the shared variance would
not be attributed to any of the regressors. According to this, the PPI
regressor explains the incremental variance that is neither explained
by the psychological regressors nor by the
physiological regressor. Individual contrast
images for sgACC connectivity modulated
by money for high-pain and low-pain levels
were then entered into second-level t tests.
Results
Model predictions on choice behavior
The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test revealed
that all MSEs did not differ from normal
distributions (p values for MSE linear in-
dependent  0.996; linear interactive 
0.877; nonlinear independent  0.993;
nonlinear interactive  0.734). A 2  2
ANOVA (integration mechanism 
shape of value function) with the four
models revealed that the nonlinear mod-
els had higher predictive power com-
pared with the linear models (F(1,23) 
17.17, p  0.001). However, we found a
significant interaction effect (F(1,23) 
21.35, p 0.001) demonstrating the su-
periority of the interactive model over
the independent model only when the
value functions were modeled linearly. Within the nonlinear
value functions, the predictive power of both integration
mechanisms did not differ substantially (t(23)  1.28, p 
0.21) (Fig. 2E; Fig. 3A–D shows choice behavior of a single
subject as a function of the subjective values derived from the
four models). Thus, we conclude that, on the basis of choice
behavior, it is not possible to identify the integration mecha-
nism. Therefore, we further compared the predictive power of
the models directly on neural data to gain insight into the
underlying cognitive integration mechanism.
Model-based fMRI data analysis
Neural representation of different subjective values
The four models showed similar patterns of correlation with
BOLD responses (Fig. 4). On average, the subjective values of the
four models showed significant correlation in the medial pre-
frontal cortex [mPFC (0, 39, 3), t(92)  3.69, p  0.001], the
central orbitofrontal cortex [cOFC (36, 48, 6), t(92)  4.39,
p 0.001], and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [dlPFC (24,
36, 54), t(92)  3.67, p  0.001] (see Table 1 for whole-brain
results).
Figure 6. Whole-brain direct comparison between nonlinear interactive versus nonlinear independent models (A, B) and the
whole-brain effective connectivity of sgACC (C). A, B, Brain regions showing significantly larger effect sizes for the nonlinear
interactivemodel comparedwith the nonlinear independentmodel. Slices represent sagittal (left) and transversal (right) views of
structural brain images with superimposed statistical maps. The circled areas indicate anterior vmPFC [BA 11 (6, 48,9), t(92)
3.18, p 0.001] (A) and dlPFC [BA 9 (30, 45, 42), t(92) 3.78, p 0.001] (B). C, Functional connectivity between sgACC and left
amygdala is enhanced as a function of money offers within the high-pain compared with the low-pain condition [(12,3,
12), t(69) 4.14, p 0.001; coronal view of structural brain image with superimposed statistical map].
Table 2. Comparison between interactive and independentmodels 
collapsed
across the curvature of value function; p< 0.005, k 5, masked with the average
map of subjective values (p< 0.05)
MNI
Region name BA x y z t value
sgACC 25 0 27 15 2.87
R dlPFC 8 42 33 42 3.43
R OFC 11 12 39 21 3.23
L Inferior parietal cortex 40 42 42 48 2.82
R Inferior parietal cortex 40 45 42 57 2.82
L Cerebellum 11 36 48 30 3.16
R Thalamus 6 15 9 3.12
Periaqueductal grey 3 33 6 3.45
R Precentral cortex 6 54 6 54 2.89
L Angular gyrus 7 36 63 48 2.80
L Middle occipital gyrus 37 51 63 20 3.31
L Occipital lobe 19 27 66 42 3.10
R Occipital lobe 19 36 81 21 2.89
Table 3. Nonlinear interactive> nonlinear independent (p< 0.001, k 10)
MNI
Region name BA x y z t value
R OFC 10/11 6 48 9 3.18
R dlPFC 8 30 45 42 3.78
R Posterior cingulate cortex 6 3 30 57 3.81
L Posterior cingulate cortex 6 3 30 72 3.42
R Occipital lobe 19 33 78 27 3.77
R Thalamus 12 12 9 3.57
L Cerebellum 36 48 30 3.48
L Midbrain 12 12 27 3.37
L Parietal cortex 7 27 78 45 3.33
R Temporal cortex 37 51 63 18 3.32
R Midfrontal cortex 6 36 6 60 3.30
L Precentral gyrus 6 30 9 60 3.47
L Parahippocampal gyrus 30 21 36 15 3.25
R Parahippocampal gyrus 30 21 24 18 3.23
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Next, we performed a whole-brain model comparison by sta-
tistically testing the effect sizes of the differentmodels. The inter-
active models showed significantly larger effect sizes in sgACC
[BA 25 (0, 27,15), t(92) 2.87, p 0.005] compared with the
independentmodels (collapsed across linear and nonlinearmod-
els) (Fig. 5A, see Table 2 for whole-brain results). In contrast,
there were no voxels in which BOLD responses were better pre-
dicted by the subjective values of the independent models. Fur-
thermore, we did not find any voxels in which BOLD responses
were significantly better predicted by the subjective values of the
nonlinear compared with the linear models or vice versa.
A post hoc ROI analysis revealed that in the sgACC, the effect
sizes of the interactive models were larger than those of the inde-
pendent models in both linear and nonlinear models separately
(t(23)  2.47, p  0.05; t(23)  2.87, p  0.05, respectively) (Fig.
5B). Thus, we conclude that values are integrated by means of an
interactive integrationmechanism and that sgACCplays a crucial
role in this function.
Identifying the neural integration mechanism
We have shown that both nonlinear models made better behav-
ioral predictions than the two linearmodels. However, within the
nonlinear models, both integration mechanisms (interactive
and independent) predicted choice behavior equally well (see
above). Therefore, we used the brain data to identify which of
the nonlinear integration mechanisms is superior in predicting
the BOLD signal in value-sensitive brain regions. Thus, this anal-
ysis can serve as a tiebreaker between competing models of brain
processes underlying decision making. The nonlinear interactive
model revealed voxels with higher effect sizes than the nonlinear
independent model in the medial OFC [(6, 48,9), t(92) 3.18,
p 0.001] and the dlPFC [(30, 45, 42), t(92) 3.78, p 0.001] as
well as other regions (Fig. 6A,B, Table 3). In contrast, we did not
find any voxel in which BOLD changes were significantly better
predicted by the nonlinear independent model compared with
the nonlinear interactive model. Hence, we conclude that the
nonlinear interactivemodel provides the better description of the
neural processes underlying choice behavior among multiattrib-
ute options.
Effective connectivity of sgACC
Finally, the whole-brain PPI analysis with the sgACC as seed
region revealed a significant difference in the money-
dependent connectivity modulation when contrasting high
versus low pain in the amygdala/sublenticular extended
amygdala (SLEA) [(12, 3, 12), t(69)  4.14, p  0.001]
(Fig. 6C).
Discussion
In the present study, we showed that value affects valuation when
advantages and disadvantages are integrated into an overall sub-
jective value. This study provides a concrete example of how
neuroimaging directly allows one to test between computational
models of decision making and facilitates the evaluation of cog-
nitive computations. Thus, our study supports the promise of
neuroeconomics that neuroimaging can significantly contribute
to the evaluation of economic questions.
Although independent and interactive subjective value mod-
els rely on different assumptions, both models make very similar
predictions about the choice behavior. Indeed, in our case, the
interactive and independent models performed equally well in
predicting subjects’ behavior when the value functions were
modeled nonlinearly. Thus, behavioral data alone were insuffi-
cient to conclude which integration mechanism (interactive vs
independent) best describes the cognitive process of integrating
the attributes’ values into the subjective value of multiattribute
options. Therefore, we went on to compare the predictive power
of the models on the neural data. This revealed that interactive
models are superior to the independent models in predicting
neural activity in the sgACC, independent of the curvature of the
value functions. Thus, this analysis of neural activation provides a
potential solution for the computational mechanisms of value
integration, for which behavioral measures in this study were not
informative. Only a few studies so far have compared different
models directly on neural data (Hampton et al., 2006, 2008;
Montague et al., 2006; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Rangel et al.,
2008). This approach is related to some model-based fMRI stud-
ies (Breiter et al., 2001; O’Doherty et al., 2004; Seymour et al.,
2004; Kim et al., 2006; Talmi et al., 2009) and provides a concrete
example of using neural signals with modeling to identify inte-
gration computations that cannot be easily identified by behav-
ioral measures. The identification of the better describing model
is essential, even if the two models may yield similar patterns of
prediction for choice behavior on one dataset, because this does
not imply that this will be the case in other decision situations.
Specifically, it is important to identifymore accurate descriptions
of the underlying process because suchmodels willmake new and
more precise predictions in future and alternative situations (see
alsoCamerer, 2007). In linewith this, future studies should create
decision situations inwhich thosemodelsmake diverging predic-
tions and compare the models’ accuracy in predictions.
Finally, we showed that the connectivity between the sgACC
and the amygdala/SLEA was modulated as a function of money
only during high-pain conditions. This suggests that interactive
value integration relies on the interplay between the sgACC and
the amygdala/SLEA.
Subjective values of all four models showed significant corre-
lations with the BOLD signal in medial PFC and OFC. This is in
line with evidence suggesting that the ventral part of the medial
PFC and OFC encodes the reward value of choice options (Aha-
ron et al., 2001;Daw et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2006; Plassmann et al.,
2008; Gasic et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2009; Kahnt et al., 2010, 2011;
Philiastides et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2010). Talmi and colleagues
(2009) have demonstrated that activity in this region increases
with rewards and is attenuated by the prospect of pain. Further-
more, our result that sgACC, togetherwith the amygdala/SLEA, is
involved in interactively modulating hedonic experience is con-
sistent with a large body of evidence from cognitive neuroscience.
In studies investigating monetary gains and losses, Breiter et al.
(2001) have reported that SLEA activity is modulated not only by
the prospect of monetary gains and losses but also by their out-
comes. In monkeys and rats, analogous regions are involved in
regulating fear by exerting inhibitory control over amygdala ac-
tivity (Sotres-Bayon et al., 2004; Quirk and Beer, 2006;Milad and
Rauch, 2007). Studies on fear extinction in rats have shown that
stimulating this PFC region modulates amygdala responses,
thereby affecting the expression of conditioned responding
(Quirk et al., 2003; Rosenkranz et al., 2003). In humans, during
extinction and the regulation of learned negative values, the
sgACC is actively engaged together with the amygdala indepen-
dent of the modulation strategy (Phelps et al., 2004; Etkin et al.,
2006; Delgado et al., 2008; Schiller andDelgado, 2010). Similarly,
sgACC–amygdala coupling is involved in pain regulation such as
placebo analgesia and pain habituation (Mayberg et al., 2002;
Bingel et al., 2006, 2007). An interesting question is whether our
results can be generalized to other types of cost–benefit integra-
9312 • J. Neurosci., June 22, 2011 • 31(25):9307–9314 Park et al. • Neurobiology of Value Integration
tion. Recent evidence suggests distinct valuation subsystems for
different types of costs and benefits. For example, Pre´vost et al.
(2010) have shown that delay and effort discounting engage dif-
ferent neural circuits (see also Croxson et al., 2009). Also, besides
sgACCand amygdala, ventromedial PFC, and striatumhave been
shown to play a key role in initial acquisition and modulation of
the fear response (Schiller and Delgado, 2010).
In summary, the present study compared different subjective
value models with independent and interactive value integration
mechanisms directly on fMRI data. This procedure provided
neural evidence that an interactive rather than an independent
integration mechanism is implemented in the brain. Further-
more, it suggests that the sgACC, in concert with the amygdala, is
critically involved in this process. By demonstrating how differ-
ent values are integrated in the brain, our results substantially
extend our knowledge about the neurobiological underpinnings
of human choice behavior.Moreover, they contribute to the field
of neuroeconomics by showing that direct model comparisons
on brain data can be used to uncover cognitive processes and
thereby to decide among competing models of decision making.
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